The Problems with the Burdens of Judgment by Hussain, Gozde
 LIBERAL LEGITIMACY, PUBLIC REASON  
AND CITIZENS OF FAITH 
© 2018 – Philosophy and Public Issues (New Series), Vol. 8, No. 1 (2018): 155-192 
Luiss University Press 
E-ISSN 2240-7987 | P-ISSN 1591-0660 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE PROBLEMS WITH THE  
BURDENS OF JUDGEMENT 
 
 
BY 
GOZDE HUSSAIN 
 
 [THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK] 
LIBERAL LEGITIMACY, PUBLIC REASON AND CITIZENS OF FAITH 
© 2018 – Philosophy and Public Issues (New Series), Vol. 8, No. 1 (2018): 155-192 
Luiss University Press 
E-ISSN 2240-7987 | P-ISSN 1591-0660 
The Problems with the 
Burdens of Judgement 
 
 
Gozde Hussain* 
 
I 
Introduction 
his paper challenges one of the main contributions of 
Political Liberalism (PL), namely the burdens of 
judgment (BoJ), on the grounds that it is superfluous 
to the project of excluding matters of the good from 
politics and it makes PL susceptible to a scepticism 
objection. From Rawls’s PL, we can extract two arguments for 
epistemic restraint in the public realm. The first is a moral 
argument based on the principles of fairness and reciprocity. The 
second is an epistemic argument derived from the idea of the 
insurmountability of BoJ. The second of these arguments, I 
contend, is superfluous for two reasons: (i) BoJ, as a descriptive 
claim cannot itself explain why citizens should uphold a form of 
toleration that requires them to honor their epistemic restraint in 
politics. (ii) The moral argument alone is sufficient to justify 
epistemic constraint in the public realm through the reasonable 
exercise of political power. 
 
* I am immensely grateful to Jonathan Seglow and Michael Bacon for their 
comments on an earlier version of the manuscript, although any errors are my 
own and should not tarnish the reputations of these esteemed persons. I also 
thank 2 anonymous reviewers for their insights. 
T 
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Moreover, acceptance of the BoJ is incompatible with 
subscribing to a reasonable comprehensive doctrine (RCD) with a 
degree of certainty that is required to be convinced of any such 
doctrine. The relation between BoJ and scepticism has been 
addressed before but these thinkers assume that it is the 
implication of BoJ namely, reasonable disagreement that entails 
scepticism. This paper lays new sceptical challenges at the doorstep 
of PL and these new challenges focus on the very idea of the 
insurmountability of BoJ. Furthermore, it argues that scepticism is 
not an appropriate epistemic commitment for PL as it is 
incompatible with the aim of freestanding political conception of 
justice. Also, it is subversive of the purpose of an overlapping 
consensus because the idea underpinning an overlapping 
consensus is that citizens should not only appreciate liberal 
political principles as reasonable but they should also accept them 
as true on the basis of their own religious or philosophical reasons. 
Provided that BoJ entails scepticism, BoJ makes citizens’ religious 
and philosophical truth claims utterly irrelevant to the stability of 
society. Accordingly, I argue that the Rawlsian account of 
reasonableness must relinquish the epistemic component, BoJ; 
instead it should articulate how the moral component of 
reasonableness entails the principles of epistemic restraint in 
politics and acting from public reasons. 
 
II 
Basic Component of Reasonableness and Central Concepts 
In A Theory of Justice, to account for the stability of justice as 
fairness, Rawls assumes that in a well-ordered society citizens can 
broadly agree upon what constitutes a good life, which includes 
aspects of Kant’s comprehensive liberalism namely, the intrinsic 
good of autonomy (Rawls 1971, 111). In his later works, Rawls 
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recasts this account as he recognises that justice as fairness requires 
a constitutional democratic regime, and under the free institutions 
of a constitutional democracy the plurality of opposing and even 
incommensurable conceptions of the good is bound to come 
about and persist: the fact of reasonable pluralism (Rawls 1985, 
225). Given the fact of reasonable pluralism, many reasonable and 
conscientious people who accept Rawls’s principles of justice 
would be unable to accept the intrinsic good of autonomy. 
Consequently, this would destabilise the conception of justice and 
liberal political order. Rawls holds, if the principles of justice are to 
serve as a basis for public reasoning without destabilising 
consequences, they must be grounded in shared reasons, rather 
than in citizens’ deeply conflicting conceptions of the good.1 In 
PL, Rawls seeks to develop a political (i.e. not metaphysical) 
conception of justice the principles of which are publicly and 
widely acceptable among reasonable citizens of a democratic 
society. 
The features Rawls attributes to reasonableness are drawn from 
a scheme of concepts and principles for articulating a certain 
political conception of the person (Rawls 1993, 86-7). 
Reasonableness can be explained in relation to its moral 
component: the criterion of reciprocity and fairness, and its 
epistemological component: BoJ.2 
 
1 Freeman, 2007, 17. 
2 To clarify this distinction, the moral component is having the moral motivation 
to find and abide by the principles of justice that are acceptable to all reasonable 
citizens. These are related to reasonable citizens’ commitment to the principles 
of fairness and reciprocity, and to freedom and equality. These are all derived 
from the fundamental idea of political society as a fair system of social 
cooperation among free and equal persons. For Rawls, the concept of the 
reasonable is a distinct and fundamental element of the idea of the society as a 
system of fair cooperation among free and equal citizens (Rawls 1993, 49-51). 
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II.1 A Criterion of Reciprocity: Moral Component 
In a democracy, political power is always the power of the 
people as a collective body. How then can it be legitimate to coerce 
all citizens to obey just one law?3 This issue is framed by Rawls’s 
liberal principle of legitimacy (Rawls 1993, 137). According to this 
principle, the use of political power should satisfy the criterion of 
reciprocity in order to be legitimate: citizens must reasonably 
believe that all citizens can reasonably accept the enforcement of a 
particular set of basic laws (ibid.). Rawls’s answer to the question 
of why citizens would be willing to fulfil this criterion begins with 
the premise that the citizens of a democratic society are reasonable 
by virtue of their commitment to constructing a political society 
that is fair and designed for mutual benefit among free and equal 
citizens. Given that reasonable citizens view the political society as 
a fair system of social cooperation among free and equal persons, 
they are expected to have the moral motivation to cooperate with 
others on the basis of the reciprocity principle i.e. on terms that all 
the similarly motivated participants can accept (ibid., pp. 49-50). 
 
 
 
 
Thus, reasonable citizens’ appreciation of the idea of society as a fair system of 
social cooperation is independent of their acknowledgment of BoJ (further 
elaborated in Section IV.1 and IV.2). BoJ, on the other hand, contains 
epistemological elements i.e. insurmountable limits on human reasoning and the 
reasonable disagreement that arises as a result. Rawls holds that reasonable 
citizens should appreciate both the moral principles and the epistemological 
assumptions to arrive at the principles of epistemic restrain in political realm. 
(See Quong, 2010, 195) 
3 Wenar 2013. 
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II.2 Burdens of Judgment: Epistemic Component 
Reasonable pluralism, for Rawls, is caused by reasonable 
disagreements and reasonable disagreements are not those that 
result from self-interest, prejudice, ignorance nor irrationality but 
rather occur as a consequence of sincere efforts of rational people 
to consider ethical, religious and philosophical questions (ibid., 58). 
Under free institutions of a democratic society, there are certain 
limits of human reason that prevent sincere and rational people 
from arriving at a common philosophical, moral and religious 
framework. The limits of human reason, called BoJ, are listed by 
Rawls as follows: (i) the conflicting nature and complexity of 
evidence, (ii) the disagreements about the relative weight that 
different considerations should carry, (iii) the indeterminacy of 
concepts and conflicts of interpretation, (iv) the experiential 
differences: the way we evaluate evidence is partly influenced by 
our subjective life experience, (v) the different kinds of normative 
consideration on both sides of a question, and (vi) all social 
institutions being limited in the number of values they can 
incorporate. (ibid. 55-7). 
Given the limits of human reason, in free societies, sincere and 
rational citizens will reasonably disagree with any particular 
conception of the good or comprehensive doctrine (CD). 
According to Rawls, this should lead reasonable citizens to reach 
two significant conclusions: (i) Public reason: BoJ set limits on the 
scope of what can reasonably be justified to others; therefore 
reasonable citizens, who acknowledge the BoJ, must restrict 
themselves to the political values of public reason (which free and 
equal citizens ought to share) and exclude their CDs (that are 
subject to reasonable disagreement) in discussing constitutional 
essentials (ibid., 59). (ii) A democratic idea of toleration: It is 
unreasonable to use their shared political power to repress 
comprehensive views that are not unreasonable and so reasonable 
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citizens should endorse the principles of liberty of conscience and 
freedom of thought (ibid., 61). 
 
II.3 An Overlapping Consensus on a Freestanding 
Political Conception of Justice 
Given that political power should be exercised on the basis of 
the ideas and principles that reasonable citizens ought to share, the 
question is, ‘how is it possible that deeply opposed though 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines may live together and all 
affirm the political conception of a constitution regime?’ (ibid., 
xviii). Rawls’s answer to this question is an overlapping consensus 
of RCDs on a freestanding political conception of justice (FPCJ). 
FPCJ is a moral conception developed for only the basic structure 
of society namely, for political, social and economic institutions in 
modern constitutional democracies (ibid., 13). It is presented as 
freestanding because it is not derived from any particular 
comprehensive metaphysical or religious doctrine but its content 
“is expressed in terms of certain fundamental ideas seen as implicit 
in the public political culture of a democratic society” (ibid.).4 Thus, 
the use of political power would be legitimate when it is exercised 
by reference to a FPCJ because it contains principles and ideas that 
the free and equal citizens of a system of fair cooperation ought to 
endorse (ibid., 137-8). 
According to Rawls, the stability of society demands that 
reasonable citizens view the principles of FPCJ not only as 
reasonable but also as rational or correct ones. This entails that 
reasonable citizens must be able to provide reasons grounded in 
their own philosophical, and religious views in support of FPCJ: 
this is what Rawls calls an overlapping consensus (OC). Since the 
 
4 In Estlund’s terms, its content is presented by reference to the truth in a 
mundane sense (Estlund 1998, 263). 
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FPCJ stays silent on the meta-ethical status of political principles, 
it would not conflict with various RCDs. It is then up to each 
citizen to decide how their RCD to decide fits with the political 
conception of justice. In this way, the FPCJ and its fundamental 
ideas5 will not only be reasonable but they can also be true or rational 
from the perspective of his or her own CDs.6 Thus, OC ensures 
the stability of liberal society. This shows that, in PL, the truth 
claims can play role in ensuring the stability of society. Rawls 
emphases the role of CDs as follows: “The fact that people affirm 
the same political conception on those grounds does not make 
their affirming it any less religious, philosophical, or moral, as the 
case maybe, since the grounds sincerely held determine the nature 
of their affirmation” (ibid., 147-8). 
 
III 
Sceptical Reasonable Citizens 
I now turn to demonstrate the implausibility of being rationally 
certain about the correctness of one’s CD while supporting one of 
Rawls’s fundamental ideas viz. the insurmountability of BoJ. It 
must be noted that this argument does not intend to challenge the 
existence of BoJ per se, i.e. whether there are actually limitations on 
 
5 Rawls views not only the FPCJ but also its fundamental ideas as subjects of an 
OC. He highlights the depth of OC as follows: “…consensus goes down to the 
fundamental ideas within which justice as fairness is worked out. It supposes 
agreement deep enough to reach such ideas as those of society a fair system of 
cooperation and of citizens as reasonable and rational, free and equal” (Rawls 
1993, 149). 
6 Rawls says: “Since we assume each citizen to affirm such view [comprehensive 
doctrines] we hope to make it possible for all to accept the political conceptions 
as true or reasonable from the stand point of their own comprehensive view, 
whatever it maybe” (ibid., 150). 
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human reasoning or whether these limitations are surmountable.7 
The concern of this paper can be summarized as follows: 
 
(a) The reasonableness of CDs is contingent upon their 
accepting the existences of BoJ as the correct explanation for 
reasonable pluralism (discussed in section II.2) 
(b) The insurmountability of BoJ is an epistemological 
assumption with particular epistemological implications namely, 
accepting this assumption entails scepticism (doubt rather than 
denial). 
(c) (b) Negates Rawls’s claim that BoJ does not have to have 
any epistemological implications. 
(d) Premises (b) and (c) defeats the purpose of FPCJ and OC. 
 
First, I present my argument for (b). In so doing, I engage with 
the prominent advocate of scepticism, Brian Barry. Barry defends the 
requirement of scepticism for three main reasons. One of them is 
that scepticism is an appropriate epistemic response to reasonable 
disagreement (the other two will be discussed in in relation to my 
argument (d) below). I contend that it is not reasonable 
disagreement that entails scepticism but the epistemological idea 
of the insurmountability of BoJ. Although Rawls and his allies 
successfully avoid the sceptical objections based on reasonable 
 
7 See Chan 2000, 11. 
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disagreements,8 in my view, this paper lays a new and more 
compelling sceptical challenges at the doorstep of PL.9 
Barry attributes scepticism to the implication of BoJ, namely, 
reasonable disagreement.10 Barry believes, it is implausible for us 
to hold a belief with certainty while we cannot persuade others of 
its truth. He states: 
 
I question, however, whether certainty from the inside can coherently be 
combined with the line that it is reasonable for others to reject that same 
view. The most promising case would seem to be that of a private religious 
revelation. Suppose that God were (as it seemed to me) to grant me a vision 
in which certain truths were revealed. A partisan of epistemological restraint 
would suggest that I might be absolutely convinced of the veridical nature 
of this revelation while nevertheless admitting that others could reasonably 
 
8 For instance, Thomas Nagel argues that it is plausible to remain convinced 
while not being able to convince others of its truth. See Nagel 1987, 230. Also, 
see Mendus 2002, 20. 
9 Enoch 2015 also explores the relation between BoJ and scepticism. He analyses 
numerous epistemological positions in the literature and contends that none of 
them would work for PL and therefore political liberals should not adopt for 
any epistemological position. My argument is different from Enoch’s in two 
ways. (i) I only focus on the relationship between the insurmountablity of BoJ 
and the basic requirements of rationality, which is not directly and explicitly dealt 
in Enoch’s account. (ii) Although I agree with Enoch that political liberals 
should not reply on any epistemological assumptions, I also argue that political 
liberals do not need to rely on any epistemological elements because the moral 
component of reasonableness alone can justify the principles of epistemic 
restraint in politics.  
10 Joseph Raz also talks about this possibility. Although he does not advocate 
that the reasonable disagreement has to imply scepticism, he points out that 
“The simplest and most elementary takes the fact of disagreement as a reason 
to double check one's own views. Disagreement is proof that at least one of the 
parties is wrong, and one must wonder whether it is not oneself who is in the 
wrong.” See Raz 1998, 50. 
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reject my evidence. But is this really plausible? If I concede that I have no 
way of convincing others, should that not also lead to a dent in my own 
certainty? (Barry 1995, 179). 
 
Barry hence suggests, in the face of reasonable disagreement 
where we cannot persuade others about the correctness of our 
conception of the good, we ought to endorse moderate scepticism. 
He seems to be arguing that it is the implication of BoJ namely, a 
reasonable disagreement, that entails scepticism. To the contrary, 
I believe that, in the face of reasonable disagreement, subjects can 
rationally remain convinced. 
In general, any reasonable disagreement is peer disagreement. It 
takes place among epistemic peers as it cannot result from 
ignorance, irrationality, bias, prejudice or selfishness.11 Epistemic 
 
11 Prior to argue that it is not the reasonable disagreement that entails scepticism, 
it is important to define the reasonable disagreement clearly and accurately. 
Those who suggest that reasonable disagreement must entail scepticism, 
essentially contend that the peer disagreement should entail skepticism. The 
definition of reasonable disagreement includes ‘the ideal reasoning’, namely 
reasoning takes place among epistemic peers. It cannot result from ignorance, 
biases, irrationality, prejudice or selfishness. This does not seem to be grasped by some 
thinkers. For instance, McCabe distinguishes the justifiability in practice from 
justifiability in theory and demonstrates that PL interprets liberal legitimacy in 
terms of what is justifiable to citizens in practice as opposed to good reasons in 
theory. He offers an analogy for justifiability in theory: ‘…an astrophysicist 
trying to justify to me some claim about the passage of time relative to an object 
moving near the speed of light would not get very far. Many of the concepts she 
would invoke and the steps of reasoning that lead to her conclusion are simply 
beyond my abilities. But my obtuseness should not shake her confidence in her 
claim. Indeed, while her claim is not in practice justifiable to most people, this 
should not lead her to doubt that it is correct and is, in some important sense, 
justifiable. Belief in the truth of many claims is often of this sort, that is, belief 
that they are justifiable to competent interlocutors with adequate epistemic 
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peers who have approximately equal powers of reasoning, are equal 
with respect to background information and have shared all 
relevant evidence. Like Barry, the epistemologist Richard Feldman 
also argues that reasonable disagreement cannot subsist between 
convinced epistemic peers because where the body of evidence is 
completely indeterminate, it seems utterly unjustified to think that 
one conclusion is true (Feldman 2017, 202). Therefore, they must 
opt for a position that can only be described as ‘agnostic’. Feldman 
bases his argument on The Uniqueness Thesis. According to this 
thesis, rationality demands that if a set of reasons uniquely support 
or discredit a proposition, agents ought to support or deny that 
proposition. If the reasons neither uniquely support nor uniquely 
deny a proposition, agents ought to suspend their judgment on a 
proposition (ibid.). Given that peer disagreement cannot uniquely 
support one set of reasons, the appropriate epistemological state is 
agnosticism. Feldman’s thesis has been challenged from many 
different perspectives. Some epistemologists challenge this claim 
on the ground that all relevant evidence cannot be shared. Or, even 
if the relevant evidence could be shared, Goldman, for instance, 
argues, it would not have the same justificatory force for the 
epistemic peer who has not experienced the evidence (Goldman 
2010, 210). Thus, I believe, in Barry’s example, the person whom 
 
capabilities faced with similar evidence.’ (See: McCabe 2000, 318). I believe, this 
analogy is not appropriate to explain the justifiability in theory that Rawls 
advocates. Given that McCabe is ignorant in the given subject, his disagreement 
with astrophysicist is irrational. It is important to appreciate that reasonable 
disagreement in theoretical justifications are not those that result from self-
interest, prejudice, ignorance or irrationality but rather occur as a consequence 
of sincere efforts of rational and competent people to consider ethical, religious 
and philosophical questions (see Section II.2). Their justifiability is limited not 
by the incompetency of their interlocutors but by the insurmountability of the 
limitations on human reasoning. Therefore, PL views the interlocutors in 
reasonable disagreements or theoretical justification as epistemic peers. 
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God granted a vision could justify his confidence in his own 
judgment in terms of the justificatory force of experienced 
evidence.12 In addition to these objections to Feldman’s argument, 
I maintain that The Uniqueness Thesis is too demanding and I 
don’t believe any normal epistemically competent subject can hold 
themselves to this epistemological standard. Barry seems to expect 
citizens of democratic society to commit to the epistemological 
standard of The Uniqueness Thesis i.e. unless all citizens can 
uniquely be united in their belief that a certain conception of 
human flourishing is the correct one, they should all doubt their 
judgments. I believe, any normal knowing subject would appreciate 
that there may be compelling reasons for others to hold different 
views. So long as subjects could believe that their own reasons can 
support their beliefs, their certainty in their judgments are justified 
and rational. This means that Barry’s epistemological standard is 
too demanding for any normal epistemically competent citizens. 
Given the demandingness of Barry’s epistemological standard, 
political liberals can convincingly deny that scepticism is the 
inescapable consequence of reasonable disagreement. 
I argue, however that individuals cannot be plausibly certain 
about their philosophical or religious views while accepting the 
insurmountability of BoJ because their certainty would be 
inconsistent with the basic requirement of rationality. To elaborate: 
the insurmountability of BoJ is not only about a subject’s position 
to their interlocutors or their interlocutor’s evidence but is also 
about their position with respect to their own reasons that support 
their judgments. The insurmountability of BoJ is an 
epistemological assumption about the nature of human reasoning. 
It lends support to the views that the reasons (or evidence) that 
support one’s judgment are vague, conflicting, indeterminate 
 
12 Other epistemologists like Thomas Kelly doubts about the epistemology of 
peer disagreement as an advice-generating enterprise. See Kelly 2010. 
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(depends on interpretation), complex or influenced by our 
subjective life experience. The minimum rationality requires 
forming a belief in response to the reasons or evidence that one 
has because beliefs that do not fit the evidence are unjustified and 
irrational.13 Here, the difference between The Uniqueness Thesis 
and basic requirement of rationality must be highlighted. The 
former demands all evidence to uniquely support one judgment 
but the latter requires subjects to be able to believe that they have 
appropriate evidence for their judgment. Thus, the latter is less 
controversial and much less demanding. So, for the basic 
rationality requirement, the subject must be able to hold that their 
reasons can support their beliefs. If subjects themselves believe 
that their reasons are inherently subject to these limitations, their 
certainty about the correctness of their judgment would not fit the 
evidence (since evidence is indeterminate, complex, influenced by 
arbitrary life experiences etc.) and so their certainty will be 
unjustified and irrational. Or to put another way, if one believes 
that there are limitations on human reasoning, one must appreciate 
that one’s reasons that support this judgement are also subject to 
these limitations. Then, how can one come to hold a belief with 
certainty, if one think that one’s reasons for one’s own judgments 
are uncertain? 
In the face of reasonable disagreement, subjects could 
appreciate that both themselves and their interlocutors may have 
compelling reasons to support their beliefs. So long as subjects 
themselves can believe that they have good reasons that support 
their judgment, their certainty is justified and rational. However, 
with the acknowledgment of the insurmountability of BoJ, subjects 
would come to realise that neither they nor their interlocutors have 
decisive, clear or non-arbitrary reasons that can justify their 
confidence in the correctness of their beliefs. Thus, it is not peer 
 
13 Conee and Feldman 2004, 55. 
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disagreement per se that entails scepticism but the acknowledgment 
of the insurmountability of the limits on human reasoning that 
requires a rational believer to opt for scepticism (interpreted as 
doubt and hesitation).14 Accordingly, scepticism is the appropriate 
epistemic response (or justified belief) to evidence which is 
inherently indeterminate, conflicting, vague and influenced by 
one’s subjective life experience. 
Quong might come to Rawls’s defence and point out that Rawls 
would not expect citizens to justify their belief in a stringent sense 
as long as their belief system exercises theoretical and practical 
reasoning in a more or less coherent and consistent manner 
(Quong 2010, 248-9). I argue, however, that even Rawls’s minimal 
expectation of consistency cannot be met due to the impact of BoJ 
on citizens’ judgement. This argument requires further exposition. 
 
14 In the epistemological literature, there is some discussion of epistemic 
permissiveness about subjects who appreciate that their beliefs are not exclusively 
supported by the evidence. According to epistemic permissiveness, in a given 
state of evidence with regard to p, it is epistemologically permissible for one to 
be confident that p, and for another to be confident that not p. Thus, subjects 
can hold that ‘I am very confident that p, but it’s also okay, given the evidence, 
to be somewhat less confident that p’ (Enoch 2015, 12). First, this idea of 
epistemic permissiveness is very controversial. But even if epistemic 
permissiveness in general makes sense, it still does not help with the 
insurmountability of BoJ. In the case of epistemic permissiveness, the subjects 
appreciate that their evidence does not exclusively support their beliefs. This 
suggests that they have some reliable evidence but it is not exclusive. By 
accepting the idea of the insurmountability of BoJ, however, subject affirms that 
all the evidence is subject to limitations and therefore there is no decisive, clear 
or non-arbitrary reasons. I maintain that so long as subjects themselves believe 
that they have some reasons for their judgment their confidence might be 
justified and rational or epistemologically permissible. However, if subjects 
believe that all the reasons (even reasons for their own beliefs) are subject to 
insurmountable limitations, their confidence is at odd with their 
acknowledgement of the limitations of human reason. Therefore, their certainty 
is unjustified and cannot be epistemologically permissible. 
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Consider the following analogy: there is a figure drawn on the floor 
and three observers A, B and C with approximately equal powers 
of reasoning and equal with respect to background information 
(they are epistemic peers). They start sharing all relevant evidence 
to determine what this figure is. Observer A describes the figure 
and holds with certainty that it is 6 while observer B, who stands 
on the opposite side of the figure, provides his line of reasoning 
and concludes that it is 9. On the other hand, observer C 
(representing the BoJ) stands between the two observers and 
suggests that the figure is vague, complex and conflicting. C thinks 
that the conclusions about this figure depend on one’s own 
perspective (the relative weight that different considerations carry) 
or one’s subjective life experience. Based on the reasons observer 
C provides, basic rationality requires C to opt for agnosticism 
about the correct judgment for this figure (or at least hold a 
judgment that it is a 6 or a 9 with doubt and hesitation). Rawls, 
however, thinks that A and B should stand in C’s position and 
appreciate that the figure is indeterminate, conflicting, vague and 
influenced by subjective life experience while also remain 
convinced about the correctness of their judgments 6 and 9. If, for 
instance, observer A was not to endorse the epistemic position C, 
Goldman could say that it is appropriate for observer A to be 
convinced about the correctness of her judgment because she 
experiences her evidence as direct observation and therefore her 
evidence has more justificatory force for her. However, when A 
stands in C’s position, there is an obvious conflict between A’s 
belief that the evidence for judgment 6 is indeterminate, and her 
confidence in the correctness of judgment 6. A holds an irrational 
epistemic position: even though the evidence is uncertain A’s judgment is 
certain. Therefore, given the basic requirement of rationality, a 
subject’s acceptance of the insurmountability of BoJ makes their 
certainty about the correctness of their judgement irrational and 
unjustified. 
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I now turn to challenge Rawls’s claim that the BoJ allows PL to 
stay on the surface philosophically and it does not have to entail 
scepticism. It must be stressed that Rawls himself does not suggest 
that BoJ should invite citizens to doubt their capacity to know the 
correctness of their conception of the good. For Rawls, BoJ simply 
explains the practical impossibility of reaching a political 
agreement in judgment on the correctness of CDs, and so 
reasonable citizens can conclude that a constitutional regime does 
not need an agreement on a CD (Rawls 1993, 63). Quong shares 
Rawls’s disclaimer and states that “…the burden of proof must lie 
with the proponents of the skeptical objection since it is they who 
claim that the burdens of judgments…should always cause people 
to doubt or be uncertain about their own beliefs.” (Quong 2010, 
254). Both the suggestions of Rawls and Quong are rather strange. 
For his account of reasonable disagreement, Rawls relies on 
controversial epistemological assumptions about the nature of 
human reasoning which includes the insurmountable limitations 
on the evidence, i.e. evidence is vague, conflicting, indeterminate (it 
depends on interpretation), complex or influenced by our subjective life 
experiences. One can reasonably challenge one of these 
epistemological assumptions. For instance, one can argue that the 
limitations on human reasoning are not as insurmountable as 
Rawls postulates or it is possible to overcome these limitations and 
justify our beliefs to each other.15 Rawls however simply denies that 
this epistemological idea of insurmountability of BoJ would have 
any implications for the epistemological position of reasonable 
citizens viz., scepticism, or that it might lead to any controversial 
 
15 For instance, Chan discusses the way in which people agree on the value of 
many basic elements of conceptions of the good life, such as the importance of 
friendship, knowledge, integrity, courage etc. (see Chan 2000, 11). Or Fluxman 
argues that it is plausible for reasonable citizens with diverse beliefs to agree on 
a partial comprehensive doctrine namely, the value of autonomous choice 
(Fluxman 1998). 
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debate. On the other hand, I understand Quong to be saying that 
since Rawls himself provides a simple disclaimer, now the burdens 
of proof lie with the proponents of the sceptical objection. This 
raises the question: Since it is Rawls and the advocate of PL who 
rely on particular epistemological assumptions about human 
reasoning for their account of reasonable disagreement, don’t they 
need to first prove that these epistemological assumptions do not 
need to be controversial nor do they have any epistemological 
implications? Above, I shoulder the burden that Quong addressed. 
I argue that the very idea of the insurmountability of BoJ is a 
particular epistemological assumption about the nature of human 
reasoning, evidence and judgment. Hence I show that this 
epistemological assumption leads to an epistemological implication 
such as the position of scepticism. Now, the burden lies with 
political liberals. They must show why the insurmountability of 
BoJ is a matter of common sense or an uncontroversial 
epistemological assumption about the nature of human reasoning, 
evidence and judgment, or why BoJ does not have to have any 
epistemological implications. This reveals that PL cannot stay on 
the surface philosophically without relinquishing the BoJ. 
If political liberals were to concede this implication, would a 
little scepticism (as doubt) pose significant issues for PL? In fact, 
one might argue, scepticism could play a crucial role in motivating 
citizens to honour their epistemic restraint in politics. It may also 
be consistent with liberal impartiality. I now turn to articulate why 
scepticism cannot be an appropriate epistemic commitment for 
PL. In so doing, I will engage with Barry who advocates the 
requirement of scepticism for liberal political order. As I 
mentioned above, Barry provides three compelling reasons for the 
requirement of scepticism. The one I already discussed above is (i) 
that scepticism is an appropriate epistemic respond to reasonable 
disagreement. The other two are as follow: 
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(ii) Moderate scepticism (understood as doubt rather than 
denial) is required because unless citizens hold the correctness of 
their conception of the good provisionally or with some hesitation 
and doubt, they would not be motivated to abstain from imposing 
their moral truth on others.16 Barry argues: ‘It is only when 
moderate scepticism is combined with a commitment to finding 
reasonable terms of agreement that it generates neutrality.” (Barry 
1995, 172). 
(iii) Barry holds that secular or religious conceptions of human 
flourishing gives rise to incompatible practical implications, which 
cannot be resolved by rational argument. The inherent uncertainty 
of conceptions of human excellence (and their practical 
implications) precludes them from being the basis of agreement 
among those who are seeking terms of political justice that no one 
can reasonably reject (ibid., 168-73). Thus, for Barry, liberal 
impartialism, i.e. staying neutral between different and conflicting 
conceptions of human flourishing, is therefore the only reasonable 
way of dealing with these inherently uncertain and irreconcilable 
conceptions of human flourishing. Furthermore, Barry assumes, 
scepticism is consistent with the liberal impartialism because there 
is a clear distinction between conceptions of human flourishing 
 
16 In response to argument (ii), Quong points out that in PL, citizen’s motivation 
to endorse the principles of epistemic restraint in politics does not have to come 
from citizen’s scepticism about the correctness of their conceptions of the good. 
Reasonable citizens’ motivation to honor their epistemic restraint rather comes 
from their willingness to satisfy the reciprocity principle. In democratic societies, 
Rawls believes, reasonable citizens are motivated to offer and abide by the 
principles that are acceptable to all reasonable citizens. This motivation is 
grounded in their belief that reasonable citizens of a democratic society would 
regard each other free and equal members of a fair system of cooperation. Thus, 
scepticism does not have to be the sources of motivation for reasonable citizens 
to honour their epistemic restraint in politics (see Quong 2010, 254-5). 
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and epistemological claims about the status of conceptions of what 
constitutes human flourishing.17 Scepticism is a claim about the 
latter and, although it may be controversial, he argues, it 
nevertheless does not impose any particular conception of human 
flourishing hence scepticism is a reliable route to liberal 
impartialism (Barry 1995, 174). 
Rawls’s response to Barry’s argument is that the scepticism 
requirement would put PL in opposition to the RCDs that are 
convinced about the correctness of their good and “thus defeat 
from the outset its aim of achieving an overlapping consensus.” 
(Rawls 1993, 150). I share Rawls’s concern that the scepticism 
requirement is subversive of PL’s aim of achieving a stable society 
for the right reasons, namely the reasons that citizens can view as 
their first-best option (grounded in their religious and 
philosophical truth claims), rather than their second- best 
compromise (depend on the distribution of political power: modus 
vivendi). So, in order for a liberal political order to enjoy legitimacy 
and stability, it must be acceptable to all reasonable citizens 
 
17 In response to the (iii), Susan Mendus convincingly argues that there is no 
stable distinction between views of human flourishing and epistemological 
claims about the status of conceptions of what constitutes human flourishing. 
She maintains that being sceptical about our comprehensive beliefs changes the 
very character of our doctrines and our disagreements. Therefore, the 
conceptions of human flourishing that are believed with certainty and 
conviction are very different than those held with hesitation or doubt. Given 
that there is no stable distinction between the views of human flourishing and 
epistemological doctrines about the status of conceptions of human flourishing, 
the scepticism requirement conflicts with the aim of liberal imperialism. In order 
words, Barry favors the conceptions of human flourishing that are sceptical in 
character and therefore, his scepticism requirement undermines the liberal 
impartialism and the permanence of doctrinal pluralism. Mendus concludes that 
Barry's solution to the problem of pluralism -namely irreconcilability of disputes 
regarding human flourishing- essentially requires removing the kind of pluralism 
to which PL is meant to be a solution. (Mendus 2002, 18-25). 
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including the ones who are convinced about the correctness of 
their RCDs. Also, I would like to point out that sceptical citizen’s 
support to the stability of society from within their religious and 
philosophical truth claims would be futile. As discussed in section 
II.3 with the account of an OC, Rawls seeks to achieve a stable 
society that can receive support from religious and philosophical 
truth claims. If however FPCJ and its fundamental ideas is only be 
appealing to sceptical citizens, needless to say, their religious and 
philosophical reasons that support the FPCJ cannot assure the 
stability of society in the desired way. For instance, if I value the 
freedom and equality of individuals on the basis of the premise that 
God creates us free and equal, the strength of my support for the 
value of freedom and equality would be related to how certain I 
am about my religious truth claims. Accordingly, if I were sceptical 
about my truth claims, I would also be sceptical about the 
significance of treating individuals as free and equals. Thus, should 
various religious and philosophical truth claims support the 
stability of society, the only way that their support can be 
meaningful is that those religious and philosophical reasons are 
held with conviction. The point here is not to exclude scepticism 
from a possible OC. Sceptics may deny the very existence of moral 
truths (on the basis of their own convictions and comprehensive 
reasons) and therefore they might uphold Rawls’s principles of 
justice as the most reasonable ones. If however citizens are 
expected to affirm Rawls’s principles of justice on basis of their 
religious and philosophical grounds, and if their religious and 
philosophical grounds are expected to be doubted, then the 
support for the principles of justice that are derived from those 
doubted grounds would be meaningless. 
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IV 
BoJ is superfluous 
Sections II.1 and II.2 presented the moral and epistemic 
components of reasonableness in Rawls’s account. Rawls believes 
that both of these components are vital to arrive at the principles 
of epistemic restraint in politics and a form of toleration (Rawls 
1993, 59). In this section, I seek to challenge Rawls’s assumption 
about the indispensability of BoJ by presenting four lines of 
reasoning: 
 
(i) BoJ is insufficient to motivate perfectionists to honor their 
epistemic restraint in politics. 
(ii) Motivation to epistemic restraint comes from the moral 
component of reasonableness. 
(iii) The justifiable and unjustifiable reasons can be articulated 
by moral component. 
(iv) Perfectionists are unreasonable for undermining the moral 
component. 
 
Nussbaum and Wenar have also addressed the superfluous 
aspect of BoJ. Nussbaum holds that it is possible to arrive at an 
agreement on the exclusion of CDs by accepting the value of 
treating people as free and equal (Nussbaum 2011, 33). Similarly, 
Wenar points out that the moral component of reasonableness 
requires acting only from publicly shared reasons, so therefore BoJ 
is redundant to the project of excluding the goods from politics 
(Wenar 1995, 41). Both thinkers, to a certain extent, support my 
second line of reasoning while staying silent on the issues that 
arguments (iii) and (iv) deal with. Consequently, their accounts are 
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subject to some compelling objections such as that, without the 
idea of BoJ, PL falls short of explaining what is unjustifiable to 
others, and how we can challenge perfectionist conclusions. Since 
these objections are not addressed, the BoJ appears essential for 
PL. Arguments (iii) and (iv) aim to overcome these objections and 
argument (i) adds a more compelling reason to the superfluous 
aspect of BoJ. In so doing, it emphasises the failure of BoJ to 
motivate citizens to honor the standards of epistemic restraint 
rather than just underlining the sufficiency of moral component of 
reasonableness (as Wenar and Nussbaum do). Thus, this line of 
reasoning demonstrates that PL can relinquish BoJ and shows why 
reasonable citizens should honor epistemic restraint in politics as 
well as what can be unjustifiable to reasonable citizens in moral 
terms. 
 
IV.1 BoJ is insufficient to motivate perfectionists to honor 
their epistemic restraint 
Scepticism, as I discussed at length above, is not an appropriate 
epistemic commitment for PL. Rawls thinks that his account of 
BoJ does not entail scepticism but rather that it makes all 
reasonable citizens accept the following view: 
 
L: Our conception of good is the correct one and others are wrong; however 
given the BoJ, it is at least reasonable for others to hold different views. Since 
it is reasonable to hold different views, it would be unreasonable for us to 
impose our moral views on others (Rawls 1993, 150). 
 
I argue for the implausibility of citizens’ certainty while 
accepting the insurmountibility of BoJ in section III. However, in 
order to demonstrate the superfluous aspect of BoJ, let’s set aside 
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my disagreement and suppose that citizens can remain convinced. 
For Rawls, without the BoJ, PL cannot account for why 
perfectionists or rationalist believers should agree on the exclusion 
of matters of the good from politics because the moral component 
of reasonableness does not explain why citizens cannot reasonably 
share the reasons derived from conceptions of human flourishing. 
For instance, a rationalist believer might hold that she has good 
reasons to support her comprehensive view and if she is convinced 
that those reasons are available to others, she could then claim, 
others – who refuse to accept her conception of the good – are 
irrational.18 In this situation, there would be no reason for a 
rationality believer to seek an agreement and no motivation to 
refrain from imposing her ‘correct’ moral view on others. 
Reasonable citizens must recognise that even ideal reasoning, i.e. 
reasoning among sincere and rational people in free societies, cannot 
lead to an agreement on the superiority of one comprehensive view 
because BoJ makes even good reasons unavailable to others. Rawls 
posits that reasonable citizens who acknowledge the existence of 
BoJ would be motivated to honour the standards of epistemic 
restraint and offer other sincere and rational citizens publicly 
shareable reasons. However, given view L, Rawls also thinks that 
reasonable citizens can remain certain that they hold the correct 
conception of the good and other sincere and rational citizens with 
different views are still wrong. This prompts the question ‘why 
would citizens give priority to the limits of human reasoning over 
their commitment to a true moral argument?’ Although BoJ may 
elucidate why others who disagree with the correct conception of the 
good might be sincere and rational, it nevertheless does not 
account for why their being sincere and rational must be weightier 
than one’s commitment to a true moral belief. The idea of BoJ, 
 
18 Rawls 1993, 153. This is related to Cohen’s rationalist fundamentalist account 
(Cohen 1993, 280-1). 
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after all, is a descriptive claim about why citizens cannot share the 
same religious and philosophical conception of human flourishing, 
rather than a normative one that justifies why it is morally 
permissible for citizens to hold their wrong views.19 It shows that 
sincere and rational people can believe in what is false. However, its 
normative implication of being tolerant to wrong (or even 
offensive and immoral beliefs from each other’s point of view) 
cannot, by default, follow. This form of toleration seems to be 
rather presupposed in PL. 
It is implicitly expected that convinced perfectionists who 
accept the BoJ will arrive at a form of toleration that requires them 
to attach less value to their commitment to a true moral argument 
than the weight they assign to the limitations of human reasoning. 
Also, they are expected to exercise forbearance when the diversity 
itself gives rise to forms of offenses such as disproval, abhorrence 
and disgust. I argue that BoJ as a descriptive claim is not the source 
of motivation for citizens to uphold this form of toleration. If a 
person is certain that her or his view is the correct one and others 
are wrong, immoral, offensive, why is another person’s inability to 
share the correct view weightier than the first person’s own 
commitment to the correct view? Neither the sincerity and 
rationality of citizens nor the limitations of human reasoning 
explain why citizens must attach less value to their commitment to 
a true moral argument and why they should be forbear offending 
conceptions of the good. In order for convinced perfectionists to 
honor their epistemic restraint they must already be motivated to 
(i) assign greater weight to the justifiability of principles to others 
over their commitment to the correct view, and (ii) be tolerant of 
wrong views. Only then can (iii) the acknowledgement of the BoJ 
– since the BoJ makes our ‘correct’ reasons grounded in our correct 
 
19 Beckman 2002, 225. 
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CDs unavailable to others- lead to the exclusion of those correct 
CDs from political realm. So the argument that it is the 
acknowledgement of the BoJ that motivates a convinced 
perfectionist to offer shared reasons is unsupported. Since (i) and 
(ii) must precede the acknowledgment of the BoJ, a convinced 
perfectionist’s motivation to honor her or his epistemic restraint in 
politics must precede her or his acknowledgement of the BoJ. 
Below, I argue that citizens’ motivation to offer each other 
justifiable reasons comes from the moral component of 
reasonableness, i.e. their commitment to the reciprocity principle 
and the freedom and equality of citizens. If this moral motivation 
has already been attributed to the political reasonableness 
(independent of their acknowledgment of the BoJ) then, I will 
demonstrate, citizens do not have to accept the BoJ in order to 
agree upon the principles of epistemic restraint in politics. 
 
IV.2 Motivation to epistemic restraint comes from the 
moral component 
In PL, Rawls attempts to derive a certain form of toleration 
from recognition of the BoJ. This form of toleration requires each 
citizen to assign greater weight to the other citizens’ attachment to 
their wrong beliefs than the weight she or he assigns to their 
disapproval of them (or their commitment to a true moral 
argument). It must be the case that even if reasonable citizens have 
the ability to supress or censure the wrong and offensive beliefs of 
others, they must refrain from doing so20 because this form of 
toleration is not a mere modus vivendi but rather a political virtue. 
It is however doubtful that this form of moral toleration can be the 
 
20 Horton 1996, 29. 
Philosophy and Public Issues – Liberal Legitimacy, Public Reason and Citizens of Faith 
180 
 
consequence of citizens’ mere recognition of the BoJ. As Robert 
Paul Churchill remarks: 
 
If Rawls believes that moral toleration results merely from our cognizance 
of the burdens of judgment, then this may be because he has already 
assumed moral toleration as part of an account to be given of what we 
recognize, and comprehend. If we do recognise, or comprehend, that the 
different views of others are reasonable comprehensive doctrines and 
therefore that others are worthy of respect because they hold these doctrines as 
reasonable persons, is not this because we are already capable of moral 
toleration? (Churchill 2003, 74). 
 
Churchill points out that insofar as moral toleration is 
presupposed in the argument, it is obviously not derived from the 
acknowledgment of the BoJ. Churchill further argues that this sort 
of moral motivation cannot be a political virtue but has to be 
grounded in the full conception of autonomy or comprehensive 
liberalism (ibid.). Although I share Churchill’s view that this form 
of moral toleration cannot be the mere consequence of recognizing 
the BoJ, I do not agree that it can only be derived from Kantian 
account of autonomy or any other comprehensive liberalism. I 
argue that this form of toleration results from citizens’ 
commitment to some fundamental political virtues or ideas 
articulated in the moral component of reasonableness. 
The concept of the reasonable is a distinct and fundamental 
element of the idea of society as a system of fair cooperation 
among free and equal citizens (Rawls 1993, 49-51).21 Or, to put it 
 
21 It must be stressed that the reasonableness of citizens is first and foremost 
contingent upon their accepting the idea of society as a fair system of 
cooperation among free and equal citizens. Reasonable citizens should not only 
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differently, the political reasonableness is primarily predicated on 
the tradition of the democratic idea that citizens are free and equal 
members of a fair system of cooperation. The freedom and equality 
of citizens is premised on the assertion that they have developed 
the two moral powers, “a capacity for a sense of justice” and “a 
capacity for a conception of the good.” (Rawls 1993, 18). A 
capacity for sense of justice assumes that all citizens of a well-
ordered society acquire a sense of justice that moves them to 
support just institutions (Weithman 2011, 309). It entails a desire 
or willingness to act from publicly shared reasons (Rawls 1993, 19) 
and it is informed by political virtues and principles that are 
implicitly shared in a democratic political culture. On the other 
hand, a capacity for a conception of the good means that citizens 
are “free and equal to form, revise and pursue a conception of their 
good” (ibid.). This conception of freedom and equality informs 
citizens’ sense of justice, and therefore citizens are expected to 
have a desire to act from this conception. Rawls explains the 
capacity for a conception of the good as follows: 
 
[W]e say that citizens are regarded as free persons in two respects. First, 
citizens are free in that they conceive of themselves and one another as 
having the moral power to have a conception of the good... A second respect 
in which citizens view themselves as free is that they regard themselves as 
self-authenticating sources of valid claims. That is, they regard themselves as 
being entitled to make claims on their institutions so as to advance their 
conceptions of the good. (Rawls 2001, 23). 
 
Another moral motivation Rawls attributes to free and equal 
citizen is their recognition of the fair value of the political liberties. 
 
recognise this idea but also be able to support it from within their CDs (Rawls, 
1993, 47-8). The latter point is discussed, in relation to the depth of OC in 
Section II.3, footnote 5. 
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The fair value of the political liberties ensures that similarly 
motivated citizens have roughly an equal chance of influencing the 
government’s policy (ibid., 46). Moreover, the basic rights and 
liberties also protect and secure the space required for the exercise 
and the realization of the two moral powers (ibid., 45). Accordingly, 
all reasonable citizens must pursue the liberties that provide the 
political and social conditions essential for the adequate 
development and full exercise of the two moral powers (ibid.). The 
fair value of political liberties enables citizens to maintain their free 
and equal status as specified by the two moral powers. 
The conception of freedom and equality, - i.e. freedom to form, 
revise and pursue a conception of their good – does not have to 
be grounded on any comprehensive foundations like Kantian 
autonomy. Rawls assumes that reasonable citizens would have the 
capacity to recognize themselves and others as free and equals 
despite their affirmation of various moral, religious, and 
philosophical doctrines because it is “within the tradition of 
democratic thought” (Rawls 1993, 18). Citizens do not have to give 
any independent weight to this conception of freedom and equality 
that informs their sense of justice. In PL, Rawls rather assumes 
that citizens’ sense of justice, which is informed by this conception 
of freedom and equality, can belong to their different CDs. Here, 
one may assume that the reason for reasonable citizens to be 
tolerant enough to regard others as free and equal to form, revise 
and pursue their conception of the good is because they accept the 
BoJ; therefore they recognize that citizens are free to reasonably 
affirm various reasonable doctrines. I, however, have shown in 
Section IV.1 that this form of toleration cannot be the mere 
consequence of the acknowledgment of the BoJ. This conception 
of freedom and equality is part of the particular political 
conception of the person namely, reasonable citizens who view the 
political society as a fair system of social cooperation among free 
and equals. Since reasonable citizens must view their society as a 
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fair system of social cooperation among free and equal persons, 
they are expected to have the moral motivation to cooperate with 
others on the basis of the reciprocity principle i.e. on terms that 
others can share (ibid., 49-59). Accordingly, both the toleration for 
the freedom and equality to hold even wrong views and the moral 
motivation to act from shared reasons precede the 
acknowledgement of the BoJ.22 These are the parts of an account 
of what reasonable citizens can and should recognize. Freeman 
represents the political conception of the person whom the 
freedom and equality is attributed as follows: 
 
This conception of the person is now said to be implicit in our awareness of 
ourselves, not as moral agents [not naturally moral agents] and in whatever 
we do, but in the more circumscribed role we occupy as democratic citizens. 
In thinking about ourselves politically, we regard ourselves as free and equal 
citizens; as such, we rationally should have a higher-order interest in 
developing the capacities or ‘moral powers’ that enable us to engage in social 
cooperation (Freeman 2007, 18). 
 
Given the moral powers attributed to reasonable citizens, they 
are expected to recognize or respect each other’s freedom and 
equality to choose a conception of human flourishing. Truly 
 
22 This is also acknowledged by Quong. Ouong points out that the motivation 
to endorse the principles of epistemic restraint comes from reasonable citizens’ 
willingness to satisfy the reciprocity principle (see Quong 2010, 254-5). I argue 
that in order for BoJ to play any part in the principles of epistemic restraint, 
citizens must assign greater weight to the justifiability of principles over their 
commitment to their correct view. When they realise others cannot agree with 
them because of the BoJ, only then would they honor their epistemic restraint 
because they must have already been committed to offer others only justifiable 
reasons. This shows that reasonableness is fundamentally contingent upon 
having the motivation to offer reasons that are justifiable to others, and this is 
independent of their acknowledgment of the BoJ, not because of it. 
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respecting other’s freedom to realise their moral powers, in 
Freeman’s terms, 
 
… involves allowing them to non-coercively decide their values and (within 
limits of justice) act on their chosen ways of life. This moral requirement 
implies a duty to allow others to make their own mistakes of judgment and 
action, and, within limits of justice, act on their false beliefs as well (Freeman 
2004, 2042). 
 
Similarly, Larmore points out that treating people with ‘equal 
respect’ is supposed to entail treating their ideas with respect even 
if we privately find them extremely silly (Larmore 1987, 64). 
Moreover, reasonable citizens are expected to recognise that 
political power is always a coercive power (Rawls 1993, 136). Given 
that citizens must be free to form, revise and to pursue a 
conception of their good in a pluralist society, this implies that 
political power should not be used to coerce citizens to accept 
certain moral truth claims but rather it should be used to provide 
the political and social conditions essential for protecting citizens’ 
freedom and equality. I maintain that, so long as reasonable citizens 
recognise each other’s freedom to form, revise and pursue a 
conception of the good and acknowledge the coercive aspect of 
political power, they would come to recognise that the use of 
coercive power on the basis of a certain conception of the good 
would undermine the value of treating each other’s as free persons. 
Moreover, given the fair value of political liberties, reasonable 
citizens must recognize that every citizen has the same right to 
influence government policy to advance their conception of the 
good. Accordingly, favoring or promoting any one CD undermines 
other citizens’ equal status. Thus, the moral component explains 
why reasonable citizens can be motivated to uphold the form of 
toleration that requires them to abstain from imposing their 
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conceptions of the good by the coercive use of state power 
because: 
 The fundamental moral power attributed to reasonable 
persons is to respect each other’s freedom and equality to decide 
non-coercively a conception of the good and to act on their chosen 
ways of life. 
 Promoting conceptions of the good by the use of coercive 
state power undermines the fair value of political liberties that are 
essential to maintain citizens’ free and equal status as specified by 
the two moral powers. 
 
IV.3 The justifiable and unjustifiable reasons can be 
articulated by moral component of reasonableness 
In democratic societies, political power is legitimate only when 
it is exercised in accordance with the principles and ideas that all 
citizens can reasonably be expected to endorse. The moral 
component of reasonableness includes some basic principles and 
ideas that all citizens can reasonably share. One of these basic 
assumptions is that reasonable citizens must be prepared to offer 
each other the fair terms of cooperation. The fair terms of 
cooperation ‘set out as principles, specify the reasons we are to 
share and publicly recognize before one another as grounding our 
social relations” (Rawls 1993, 53). This has also been framed by 
one of the two moral powers attributed to reasonable citizens 
namely, ‘a capacity for a sense of justice’. A sense of justice entails 
a desire or willingness “to act in relation to others on terms that 
they also can publicly endorse” (ibid., 19). Accordingly, reasonable 
citizens who have equal capacity for a sense of justice are required 
to act from publicly recognized reasons and these publicly 
recognized reasons are assumed to be implicit and shared in a 
democratic political culture. It must be highlighted that the idea of 
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society as a fair system of cooperation among free and equals, 
Rawls assumes, is one of the implicit and shared ideas in the public 
political culture of a democratic society. It must also be noted that 
the BoJ plays no role in specifying the reasons which are justifiable 
to all citizens in a democratic political culture. It only accounts for 
unjustifiable reasons namely, conceptions of the good. It is the 
moral component that defines the reasonableness as a 
preparedness to offer only public reasons, and again, it is only the 
moral component that sets out public reasons as the implicitly 
shared idea of society as a fair system of cooperation among free 
and equals. 
Here, an advocate of BoJ might point out that although the 
moral component can specify what the fair terms are or what is 
justifiable to others, it nevertheless does not explain why the 
conceptions of the good cannot be justifiable to all citizens. 
Therefore, in order to exclude the good from politics, we need BoJ 
to justify the move from disputable to publicly accessible reasons. 
It is true that BoJ, in epistemic terms, explains why citizens cannot 
all share one conception of the good, however, the unjustifiable 
reasons do not have to come in the form of an epistemological 
argument. Although the moral component does not explain, in 
epistemic terms, why all cannot share one comprehensive doctrine, 
it nevertheless accounts for why all citizens do not have to share 
one conception of human flourishing. The moral component 
therefore explains unjustifiable reasons in relation to the moral 
ideas, and not in epistemic terms. To be explicit, the moral 
component already includes the value of respecting citizen’s 
freedom and equality to non-coercively develop and pursue a 
conception of the good. Citizens who conceive themselves and 
others as free and equal would appreciate that, should coercive 
political power be used on the basis of a certain conception of 
human flourishing, citizens would have no option but act from it. 
This then explains why it would be unacceptable for conceptions 
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of the good to inform the use of coercive state power for reasonable 
citizens who would like to be free to act from their chosen 
conceptions of human flourishing rather than being coerced to act 
from a certain conception of human flourishing which they may 
reject. Thus, the moral component is sufficient to set out both 
justifiable and unjustifiable terms of social cooperation as follows: 
 Justifiable terms: reasonableness is a willingness to act from 
the publicly recognized idea of society as a fair system of 
cooperation among free and equal persons 
 Unjustifiable terms: given reasonable citizens’ willingness to 
respect each other’s freedom and equality to form, revise and 
pursue a conception of their good, it would be unacceptable for 
free and equal citizens to base the use of coercive power on a 
particular conception of human flourishing. 
 
IV.4 Perfectionists are unreasonable for undermining the 
moral component of reasonableness 
It must be highlighted that reasonable is not derived from 
rational; it is a distinct and fundamental element of the idea of the 
society as a system of fair cooperation among free and equal 
citizens (ibid., 49-51). Given that the moral component already 
requires citizens to be motivated to act from publicly shared 
reasons and acknowledge the wrongness of imposing one 
conception of the good by the use of state power, it then becomes 
irrelevant whether rationalist believers or perfectionists have good 
reasons that are available to others. This is because offering 
publicly shared reasons to one another is the reasonable thing to 
do even when this means some sacrifice to one’s rational interests. 
To put it differently, since reasonableness is defined in terms of a 
willingness to acknowledge the wrongness of imposing CDs by the 
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use of coercive power and a desire to offer one another reasons 
that are fair (namely, publicly recognized reasons), perfectionists 
should be considered unreasonable by virtue of their lack of desire 
or motivation to offer publicly shared reasons and their motivation 
to coerce citizens to act from certain conceptions of the good. 
Therefore, PL does not need to invoke an additional epistemic 
argument to convince unreasonable views. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper demonstrated two major problems in Rawls account 
of the BoJ: (i) BoJ entails scepticism because citizens’ recognition 
of the BoJ makes it implausible for them to be rationally certain 
about their conceptions of the good. It argues that scepticism is 
not an appropriate epistemic commitment for PL as it defeats the 
purposes of FPCJ and an OC. (ii) The BoJ, as a descriptive claim 
itself, cannot explain why citizens should uphold a form of 
toleration that requires them to honor the standards of epistemic 
restraint in politics. The paper argues that this form of toleration 
can be derived from the moral powers and virtues that are 
articulated in the moral component of reasonableness. It then 
demonstrated that, given that this form of toleration results from 
citizens’ commitment to political ideals and virtues in the moral 
component of reasonableness – i.e. freedom, equality and a 
willingness to offer publicly shared reasons – the moral component 
alone is sufficient for reasonable citizens to accept the fairness of 
principles of epistemic restraint in politics. Thus, the 
reasonableness of citizens should not be contingent upon their 
uncertainty about the correctness of their religious or philosophical 
reasons, but rather it must be dependent on citizens’ 
acknowledgment of each other’s freedom and equality, and the 
fairness of principles of epistemic restraint in politics. 
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This modification has some implications for PL. One 
implication is that it resolves the conflict between the 
acknowledgment of the BoJ, which entails scepticism, and the need 
for deeper philosophical, moral or religious reasons about which 
citizens can be certain- for the FPCJ. Moreover, it ensures the 
stability of society for the right reasons by staying silent on the 
meta-ethical status of political principles. Finally, it makes the 
concept of the reasonable much wider as it includes citizens who 
accept or deny the existence of the BoJ. 
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